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WEAKENING THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A VICTORY FOR TERRORISM
Stephen Reinhardt*
NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMER-

By Richard A. Posner. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006.
Pp. xiv, 178. $18.95.
GENCY.

INTRODUCTION

What is most remarkable about Richard Posner's' latest book-and he
has written many-is that he argues that we should repose full confidence in
the executive branch to handle the most sensitive constitutional issues of our
time without once mentioning the flagrant breaches of law and critical
falsehoods with which President Bush and his administration have deluged
the public since 9/11. This only seven years after he composed a lengthy
tome regarding President Clinton's impeachment in which he appropriately,
if harshly, condemned the president for his unethical and illegal conduct,
principally his deliberate lies and purposeful lack of candor with the American people. Nor, although perhaps less directly relevant to his present book,
does Posner discuss at any point the lawlessness and deception of President
Nixon and his high aides and advisors, let alone the Iran-Contra affair under
the Reagan administration or the countless other executive branch abuses of
power we have suffered in the past twenty-five years.
Posner's omissions critically undermine the central argument of Not a
Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency. Posner
advocates a shrinking Constitution whenever the country faces a national
emergency; he advises that in such times, we should look exclusively to the
executive branch, not the courts, to safeguard our most valued freedoms
because judges "know[] little about the needs of national security" (p. 9).
Apparently Posner's answer to the problem of balancing national security
with liberty is to simply leave the fate of our Constitution to George W.
Bush and Dick Cheney. Although Posner writes eloquently about history, he
seems to have learned little from it--or from current events that appear on
the front pages of our newspapers daily. The problem with Posner is not his
writing, which is excellent. The problem is his judgment, which is not.
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THE NEVER-ENDING EMERGENCY

One fundamental difficulty with Posner's thesis is that the current national emergency that evoked his latest outpouring of advice to the citizenry3
is unlike all other national emergencies in the history of our country. Most
emergencies have occurred in times of declared war or civil war; all could
be seen clearly from the outset as being of limited duration. Today's national
emergency-whether it be viewed as the continuing threat from al-Qaeda or,
more broadly, as the threat from the potential actions of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups-has no temporal boundaries. Nor is the state of crisis
likely to end, like more traditional wars, with a peace treaty or other formal
negotiated agreement. In fact, there may be no clear way of determining if
and when the type of national emergency that now confronts us has in fact
come to an end, if it ever does in our lifetime. In short, we face an indefinite
or semipermanent state of national emergency, which requires us to ask, Do
we really want to surrender our constitutional rights, or even turn them over
to the tender mercies of the executive branch (including those who advocate
jailing American citizens without court approval), when the changes that are
made may indeed become permanent? In practical reality, given the indeterminate length of the current emergency, the subtitle of Posner's book
could well be simply The Constitution rather than The Constitution in a
Time of National Emergency.
Although few would doubt that we presently face a serious threat to our
national well-being from outside forces or that the prospect of further attack
by foreign terrorist forces must be of critical concern to any national administration, recent history reveals that an unchecked executive branch and
an amorphous national threat are a dangerous combination. No more need
be said about how the nation was cajoled into an unnecessary and undesirable war in Iraq, not only by the deliberate creation of fears over nonexistent
nuclear weapons, but by false representations concerning the presence of alQaeda in that country-or that the nonpartisan head of our top intelligence
agency simply told the president what he knew his client wanted to hear
when he said, "It's a slam dunk. ' 4 The use of terrorism to promote a president's political agenda, unfortunately, is not a practice limited to President
Bush. President Clinton used the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal
building by two members of an otherwise harmless militia movement to
have attached a little-noticed provision to an antiterrorism bill.' The provision drastically limited the rights of state prisoners to present constitutional
challenges to their state convictions and sentences, especially death sentences. Commonly referred to by the name of the statute as a whole, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), the provision,
3. Posner states that the main purpose of his book is to explain the law in a way that will
persuade the Supreme Court to adopt his views. That is a rather odd way for a sitting judge to seek
to influence the Court. But Posner has never been noted for his intellectual modesty.
4.

BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 249 (2004).

5. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110
Stat. 1214, 1218 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)).
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enacted only months before the 1996 presidential election, had nothing to do
with terrorism-but it did allow Clinton to argue that he was tough on
crime, a law-and-order president, and deserving of reelection. Given this
history, it is important that we define national threats circumspectly and not
permit them to be used as a cover for other, more political goals a president
may have.
In one peculiar passage, Posner lumps foreign and domestic assaults on
life and property, both major and minor, under a large umbrella of terrorism.
His approach is similar to President Clinton's blatant political action with
respect to AEDPA in 1996, but it is less understandable because Posner is
both a judge and a scholar. After announcing the curious and heretofore unrecognized proposition that it was the Soviet Union's theft of atomic secrets
that "emboldened Stalin to encourage North Korea to invade South Korea,
precipitating a war that killed thirty-six thousand American soldiers," Posner
proceeds to charge that "terrorism by Puerto Rican separatists, neo-Nazis,
the Jewish Defense League, left-wing radicals such as the Weathermen, and
al-Qaeda culminated in" the 9/11 attack (p. 46). What the Jewish Defense
League or the other groups have to do with al-Qaeda or 9/11 is beyond me,
but Posner's treatment of all these groups in a similar manner illustrates the
danger of failing to limit our definition of national emergency to specific
occurrences that truly threaten our nation's security. It also makes one shudder at the idea of our national policy being guided by those sharing Posner's
sweeping and indiscriminate views of terrorism.
II. WHAT JUDGES Do
Before discussing the major points of Not a Suicide Pact, as well as
some less significant tangents on which Posner leads us, I should note that
he is truly an unusual figure in the world of judges. Posner and I would
probably disagree strongly on the qualities that make a good judge: in my
view they include compassion, sensitivity, empathy for others, and a commitment to the pursuit of justice. (It goes without saying, of course, that they
also include other, more "technical" qualities such as intellectual ability, a
knowledge of the law, and the capacity to persuade others to accept one's
views regarding a legal proposition or case.) I very much doubt that Posner
believes that the former set of qualities is important to judging, let alone that
one must possess them in order to be a first-rate judge. But perhaps I underestimate him. I hope so.
Leaving aside that question, however, one has to admire Posner for the
contributions he has made to legal thought. It's not easy to be a federal appellate court judge. Some of us work long hours, six to seven days a week,
and take only limited vacations, just trying to handle our caseload. Of
course we try to make some additional contributions by writing occasional
law review articles or book reviews; judging a few moot courts a year; and
speaking to groups of law students, especially groups like the American
Constitution Society and the Federalist Society. Many of us are overwhelmed by the effort to keep up. Posner, however, not only does his normal
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work as an appellate court judge, writing opinions that frequently attract
much attention, but he also retains his job as a law professor at one of the
nation's top law schools, the University of Chicago, and is a prolific author
of popular books and articles. He has written thirty-seven books alone. Any
one of these three jobs would be as much as most of us could handle. This
book, like his other work I recently read-An Affair of State: The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton-is extremely well
written, thorough, clear, and demonstrates a firm grasp of the legal and political issues involved.
My quarrel is unfortunately with Posner's conclusions and, more particularly, his judgment. To use his words, I admire his skills as a
"technician" but not as a "policy maker" (p. 19). Recently, for example, he
wrote a review of a book by the world's leading jurist, Aharon Barak, the
former president of the Israeli Supreme Court
who teaches with some regu6
larity in his spare time at Yale Law School. Posner ends the review with the
incredible statement, "No wonder he frightens Robert Bork."7 Talk of bad
taste, let alone bad judgment. It would be tough to match. Bork is a bitter
figure still licking his wounds from his public rejection. Barak is a giant in
the law, admired throughout the world. Shame on Posner! On a more fundamental level, I do not agree with Posner that sensitive constitutional
issues-ranging from affirmative action, abortion, free speech and the separation of church and state to the Fourth or even the Second Amendmentcan be decided with cold mathematical equations or the myopic application
of cost-benefit analysis. In a messy world of irreconcilable moral debates,
imperfect information, irrational actors, and unequal distribution of resources, I find the promise of the tidy and purportedly objective tenets of
Law and Economics to be hollow. I much prefer to look to a more traditional and humane approach involving Law and Society or Law and Justice.
Posner takes a swipe at the traditional approach when he writes that the
Warren-Brennan Court's decisions were "exercises of political will rather
than of professional judgment" (p. 22). Posner's idea of professional judgment is to measure the extent of appropriate constitutional protections by
applying a form of cost-benefit analysis. As far as I can tell, in the end his
approach requires the same application of subjective values as does any
good-faith attempt to determine how the words of a document written over
two-hundred years ago should be applied to the unimagined and unforeseen
problems of the drastically changed society in which we live today. Posner
believes a judge presented with a national security case should always ask
"whether a particular security measure harms liberty more or less than it
promotes safety" (p. 32). There is no way for a judge to answer this question
other than by applying his best judgment: first by examining all the pertinent facts and reviewing the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions,
the legislative history, the applicable caselaw, and any articles or treatises on
6.

Richard A. Posner, EnlightenedDespot, NEW
(2006)).

AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY

7.

Id.at 56.

REPUBLIC,

Apr. 23, 2007, at 53 (reviewing
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the subject; and then by exercising sound judicial judgment, which will be
influenced by the judge's judicial philosophy as well as by his view of the
role and purpose of the Constitution, his knowledge and understanding of
history, and perhaps other social or even physical sciences, his own personal
experiences, and sometimes his religious views. The confluence of all these
elements will lead the judge to perform the balancing that Posner deems
necessary and then to determine what he believes to be the right answer.
Whether this is the professional judgment that Posner admires or the "exercise[] of political will" that he deplores is largely in the eye of the beholder
(p. 22). One thing it is clearly not, however-it is not simply "call[ing] balls
and strikes," as our Chief Justice told the Senate Judiciary Committee his
function would be.' In fact, as the last term of the Supreme Court demonstrates, his function is quite the opposite.
Posner arrives at the same conclusion I do: pragmatic concerns play a
major role in judicial decision making. We both view legal questions in light
of real problems, not simply as abstract concepts. But he gets to that point
by a rather roundabout method. After he poses the question of harm to liberty versus increase in safety, he offers an example of a mathematical
formula:
Suppose liberty is worth 1,000 and security only 100; nevertheless, a 20
percent reduction in security as a result of invalidating some defensive
measure (such as detaining terrorist suspects incommunicado) will cause
more harm (100 x .20 = 20) than a 1 percent reduction in liberty as a result
of upholding the measure (1,000 x .01 = 10). (pp. 32-33)
This, of course, is a wholly unrealistic form of analysis. Concepts like liberty and security are simply not susceptible to such measurements. After
nine pages of wandering through the forest of judicial decision making,
Posner ends by saying:
It may be objected that a decision process based on a balancing of risks
and harms is unworkable if the risks and harms cannot be measured. It is
true that in the present setting they cannot be quantified. But we make
pragmatic utility-maximizing decisions all the time without being able to
quantify the costs and benefits of the alternatives among which we are
choosing.... [W]e cannot avoid making such judgments and there is no
good alternative to making them pragmatically. (p. 41)
Making decisions pragmatically is precisely what the Warren-Brennan
Court did. The Warren-Brennan Court pragmatically concluded that segregation was contrary to our constitutional principles, that persons accused of
felonies should have the right to counsel, that there should be a strict separation between church and state, and that democracy meant that each person's
vote should be counted equally-and it did so without mathematical formulas or the benefit of law and economics. The members of the Court simply
exercised sound judgment using the method I describe above. And a
8. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr.to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005).
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pragmatic decision as to how much the country is harmed by reducing its
civil liberties and whether that loss of liberty is more or less important to the
nation than the increase in security that might result is necessarily based in
large measure on the constitutional values of the person making the decision
and his evaluation of what the long-range and short-range consequences
might be. Justice Brennan might well have come to one decision in such a
case; Chief Justice Rehnquist another. Neither would have been more or less
"professional" than the other. The difference is likely to depend instead on
the individual's values, his estimate of the world's political dangers, and his
view of the nature and purpose of our Constitution. As Posner acknowledges
openly at one point in his book, justices are "policy makers," not "technicians" (p. 19). In this context, it is difficult to see how Posner's equations
and other mathematical formulas advance the course of judicial decision
making.

III.

THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE AND THE JUDICIARY
DURING EMERGENCIES

I will now proceed to the two major premises (and two of the lesser
ones) of Not a Suicide Pact. First, Posner urges an essentially noncontroversial point-noncontroversial in theory, that is, but highly controversial in
application. He tells us that the Constitution is a flexible document and that
the nature and extent of individual rights must be evaluated in the context of
the times (pp. 31-32). That is true. In times of national emergency, courts
are likely to view issues almost entirely from a pragmatic standpoint and to
give even greater deference to the judgment of the executive branch than in
peacetime.
But deference does not mean abdication. As is so often the case in the
law, it is the application of the principles that divides judges-it is the extent
of the deference to be afforded as well as the values and judgments that the
individual judges apply to the particular problems we confront. In the case
of the rather typical problem that Posner posed earlier, "whether a particular
security measure harms liberty more or less than it promotes safety" (p. 32),
the answer, of course, will be influenced by the extent of the danger to the
country that exists at the time the issue comes before the court. This follows
from the fact that courts answer real and not abstract questions-they deal
with real and not abstract problems. Still, in some cases, the resolution may
depend in part on the degree of skepticism the judge may feel regarding the
executive branch's representations, based upon his and the country's experience with similar official declarations. It will depend upon the value the
judge attaches to security and to liberty, and it will depend upon the degree
to which the judge is willing to trust the future of the Constitution to the
particular administration in power-especially as some constitutional protections once lost may be difficult ever to regain. So in short, yes, the
Constitution is likely to be construed as more protective of individual rights
in ordinary times than in times of national emergency, but how much so?
The answer depends in part on who is "the decider"-who makes the de-
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termination-and it is here that I have my greatest disagreement with Posner.
Posner minimizes the role of courts in times of national emergency-for
several reasons, all erroneous in my opinion. First, he writes, judges are reluctant to act because they are ignorant of national security issues (pp. 3536). But federal judges are generalists. It is no harder to learn the issues and
facts regarding national security cases than those regarding copyright matters or a host of other new questions related to the Internet and other
emerging technologies-no harder if the judge is willing to stand up to the
executive branch and compel the government to provide the information
necessary to informed decision making. Furnished with that information, a
judge has all the tools necessary to evaluate national security matters, bearing in mind the deference he owes to the judgments of the executive branch.
Judges are, moreover, the officials best able to make an evaluation of the
facts-to look only to what is truly relevant. They need not be concerned
about political considerations or their own reelection or careers. Only judges
have lifetime tenure, a factor that reflects the wisdom and foresight of the
drafters of our Constitution. And judges are certainly better informed regarding the other half of the equation: how much liberty will we lose in the
event of a decision favoring the government, and what will be the long-term
impact on our constitutional rights?
Next, Posner suggests that in times of national emergency, judges tend
to become shrinking violets-they refuse to challenge the executive
branch's view of the need to shrink constitutional rights (p. 36). This may be
so in some cases, but it should not be. Times of national emergency are
when courts are needed most, when judges should rise to the occasion, fulfill their role, and do their full job. This is the time of greatest danger to
constitutional rights, and so it is the time that courts should be most vigilant.
Judges should rise to the occasion, not plead a lack of ability to act like
judges. Judges have sometimes wrongly given the executive branch its head
only to have the country strongly regret it when the crisis was over. Such
occasions include the Alien Sedition Act of 1798, the suspension of habeas
corpus by Abraham Lincoln in 1862, the Mitchell Palmer red scare raids
during World War I, the internment of Japanese Americans in World War II,
and the McCarthy-era witch-hunt investigations of Communists and leftwingers. The Courts failed in these cases, but the country can learn-and so
can judges. We need not continue making the same errors over and over
again. It is in times of crisis that judges should recognize that they are members of the only branch of government not subject to political pressure and
that they belong to the branch best equipped to perform the necessary balancing of sensitive constitutional and national security interests.
There are encouraging signs in the past half century. There is the Steel
Seizure case, in which the Supreme Court limited the president's power to
seize private property during wartime without specific constitutional authority or congressional authorization. There is the unanimous Watergate
9.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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decision, in which the Supreme Court ordered President Nixon to turn over
his secret tapes, a decision that brought down his presidency. '° There are
more recent signs that the Court may be willing to perform its job with respect to the terrorism issues that Posner (and the current administration)
believes to be the sole prerogative of the executive branch. In Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, for example, the Court imposed constraints on the executive
branch's ability to set up military commissions to try war-on-terror detainees." The Court will be considering this critical issue further this term in the2
States.'
consolidated cases of Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United
Nor should we underestimate the strength and independence of lower-court
judges on both ends of the political spectrum, including those who have already exhibited these qualities during our present national emergencythose who have had the fortitude and courage to stand up to the executive
branch and say no when it attempted to exceed its lawful authority.
Finally, Posner asserts that the executive branch is better equipped to decide issues of security versus liberty than the courts. Here Posner's position
simply reflects his view that we should trust the executive branch in times of
war:
It is better that the president assume the full responsibility for national security surveillance than that responsibility be diffused by enlisting the
participation of judges under conditions in which they would be unable to
exercise an effective check on executive power. We are not well served by
judicial fig leaves. (p. 102)
There are two answers to this. Judicial review need not and should not
consist of "fig leaves," and leaving these issues solely to the executive
branch jeopardizes our interest in constitutional government. The heart of
the problem is whom America should trust to balance the need for both security and liberty in times of national emergency. Posner says judges don't
know enough about security-a premise I squarely reject. Even if Posner
were right that judges have only a limited understanding of national security
issues, at least the courts would be aware of the need to consider fully both
the liberty and security issues. Without the intervention of judges, would the
president and his administration be willing to give the proper attention to
liberty? Posner demonstrates surprisingly naive confidence in the executive
branch-those officials who have the primary responsibility to implement
our national security interests. Would we let police chiefs decide when the
Fourth Amendment should apply, when Miranda warnings should be given,
when defendants are entitled to have lawyers at their trials? I would hope
not. I would also not trust most presidents or CIA directors to decide when
our constitutional rights should be abridged without their decision being
subject to the checks and balances that judicial review affords.

10.

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

11.

126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).

12.

127 S.Ct. 3078 (2007).
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Posner stresses that it was Lincoln who suspended the writ of habeas
corpus during the Civil War. He is fascinated by this occurrence, and while
he would not quite authorize modern presidents to follow in Lincoln's footsteps, Posner appears tempted to justify the authority of presidents not only
to suspend the writ but to suspend the Constitution (pp. 153-54). Perhaps it
is time to return to a point I made at the outset. We cannot discuss these issues intelligently without considering the human equation. How much
power can we safely put in the hands of fallible, and sometimes incompetent
and less than truthful, leaders? Courts are a different matter. There is no single chief. There is a process that usually involves the participation of a
number of highly trained, well-educated, and comparatively neutral lifetime
public servants. A president, on the other hand, may be irresponsible, deceptive, politically motivated, and without any particular concern for the
perpetuation of constitutional principles. We are all familiar with the character and record of Abe Lincoln; we are also aware that some of the more
recent occupants of the White House are clearly no Abe Lincolns. They are
not even Jimmy Carters. (Although Carter may not have been the most effective president, he was at least a person of principle and integrity.) Can we
take the risk of an executive branch with no checks on its power and the
authority to suspend our rights on its own? Here I disagree flatly with Posner. I do not think we can.
Now to two of Posner's more specific points, both in my view based at
least in part on a misunderstanding of the current state of affairs in this
country. Posner believes that we need more restrictive laws preventing the
press from publishing classified material and punishing leakers and publishers of leaks. He writes that there is a "national culture of nosiness, and of
distrust of government bordering on paranoia" (p. 108). Aside from the
problem of enforcing such antipress laws in a society in which the Internet
is an increasingly dominant force and bloggers are rapidly replacing reputable reporters, Posner has the problem exactly backward. The difficulty in
our country today is not that we know too much about what our government
is doing but that we know too little. Had we known more, we might not be
in Iraq today. The newspapers-including the nation's finest, the New York
Times-failed us when we were being led into the wrong war at the wrong
time. They were misled by deliberate propaganda leaks by the government
and failed to view official releases with sufficient skepticism and to probe
for the truth in a more than superficial manner.'3 The remainder of the problem is the overclassification of documents and the excessive claims of
executive privilege. It is not only affairs of international relations of which
the public remains ignorant but also corruption in the award of government
contracts and malfeasance in the general conduct of domestic affairs. Instead of advocating laws to silence the press, Posner would do well to lend
his highly respected voice to calls for more openness in government and
more truthfulness from our top officials.
13. For a discussion of this failure, see Michael Massing, Now They Tell Us, N.Y.
BOOKS, Feb. 26, 2004, at 43.
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Similarly, Posner believes that concern about governmental invasion of
privacy is largely unwarranted in current times. He tells us that the days of J.
Edgar Hoover are over and that now terrorism, not privacy, should be our
concern (pp. 144-45). Given the constant improvement in techniques for
electronic spying and the development of new methods of obtaining and
storing the most detailed information regarding every aspect of the average
citizen's existence, I am not nearly so sanguine about what our government
may be doing. And I am even more concerned with what they will do if privacy legislation does not keep up with new information-gathering
techniques. Certainly it is essential to allow the government to collect information about the activities of terrorist groups. But it's far too early to
stop worrying about the protection of our privacy and of our civil liberties
while it does so.
Posner has some other interesting ideas that time and space preclude me
from discussing. He suggests the reclassification of offenses from two (war
and crime) to three (war, crime, and terrorism) (p. 72). He advances a view
of the use of torture that is, oddly, very similar to that of Aharon Barak. 4
Unlike Barak, however, he approves of violations of Muslims' free speech
rights, especially in their mosques, if they are adherents of radical fundamentalism (pp. 112-13). He differentiates such violations from
investigations of Communists in the Cold War era on the interesting ground
that the Communists advocated a "legitimate" view that was acceptable in
Western culture (pp. 113-14). Despite his general antiprivacy attitude, he
even comes down on the side of privacy once when he strongly criticizes the
Supreme Court's view in United States v. Miller 5 that disclosures of one's
medical information to a doctor or financial data to a bank constitute a general waiver of one's right to privacy in that material; here Posner is clearly
right (pp. 136-37).
CONCLUSION

All in all, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National

Emergency is well worth reading. It could have been labeled A Bulwark of
Liberty, however, followed by the same subtitle. Posner, able writer that he
is, could then have explained how the Constitution stands between the people and the loss of our liberty, especially in times of war and strife. Such a
tome would fill a national need far more than a book that plays into the fears
of terrorism to which we are all so regularly subjected. There is one final
point, however, that we need no book to help us understand. Posner repeatedly notes that it is the Supreme Court that tells us from time to time what
the Constitution means and what rights we have, that Justices are "policy
makers" (p. 19), that our protections are "realistically regarded as more the
handiwork of Supreme Court justices than of the Constitution's framers"
14. See pp. 81-85. For Barak's view on torture, see HCJ 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817.
15.

425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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(p. 21). That is why the battle over the appointment of members of the Court
is so critical and why the Democrats-belatedly, and possibly too late-may
finally be awakening to the importance of the Supreme Court confirmation
process, something that the right wing well understood many years earlier.
I feel more confident in judges than in elected officials safeguarding our
constitutional liberties. But I would feel even better were there some Warrens, Brennans, Marshalls, Douglases, Blackmuns, or even more Stevenses
currently making the decisions that will determine the nature of our rights
and freedoms-and indeed the nature of our society-for years to come. I
would even feel more comfortable with a Richard Posner making such decisions than a George W. Bush-but not by much.
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